

Henry R. Luce · »The American Century«

Henry Robinson Luce (1898-1967) war ein einflussreicher US-amerikanischer Verleger, der die Zeitschriften *TIME* (1923) und *Life* (1936) gründete bzw. neu begründete. Luce wurde im chinesischen Tengchow als Sohn eines presbyterianischen¹ Missionars geboren. Er wurde an diversen Internaten in China und England unterrichtet. Mit 15 kam er das erste Mal in die USA und an der renommierten Hotchkiss-School² in Lakeville (Connecticut) aufgenommen; 1920 promovierte er im Fach Geschichte an der mit Hotchkiss verbundenen Yale-University. Entscheidend für seine berufliche Laufbahn war das Zusammentreffen mit Briton Hadden, dem damaligen Chefredakteur der Schulzeitung in Hotchkiss. Luce arbeitete dort als »Assistant Managing Editor« mit. Die beiden setzten ihre Partnerschaft in Yale fort, Hadden als Vorsitzender und Luce als Chefredakteur der »Yale Daily News«. Nach seinem Abschluss in Yale war Luce ein Jahr als Assistent an der Universität in Oxford tätig. Nach seiner Rückkehr arbeitete er als Redakteur für die »Chicago Daily News«. 1921 schloss er sich Hadden bei den »Baltimore News« an. Beide gaben ihre Arbeit 1922 auf, um das »TIME Magazine« zu gründen. Am 3. März 1923 kam die erste Ausgabe von »TIME« heraus, Luce agierte dabei wieder als »Business Manager« und Hadden als Chefredakteur. Nach Haddens Tod 1929 nahm Luce auch dessen Position ein. Luce übernahm 1936 das fotografisch ausgerichtete »Life Magazine« und gab ihm eine redaktionelle Grundlage, die den Kreis der Bezieher erweitern sollte. Als erster Verlagsunternehmer in den USA produzierte Luce auch Dokumentarserien für Radio und Kino. Luce, der bis 1964 Chefredakteur seiner sämtlichen Zeitschriften blieb, war zudem ein einflussreiches Mitglied der Republikanischen Partei. Trotzdem unterstützte er publizistisch den demokratischen Präsidenten Franklin D. Roosevelt, der sich seit 1936 zunehmend besorgt über den Vormarsch der autoritativen Regime in Europa und Asien³ zeigte. Sein berühmtester Leitartikel zur Flankierung der Politik des US-Präsidenten - »The American Century« - erschien im Februar 1941 im *TIME Magazine* ...

We Americans are unhappy. We are not happy about America. We are not happy about ourselves in relation to America. We are nervous - or gloomy [schwermütig] - or apathetic [apathisch].

As we look out at the rest of the world we are confused; we don't know what to do. »Aid to Britain short of war« is typical of halfway hopes and halfway measures [Maßnahmen].

- 5 As we look toward the future - our own future and the future of other nations - we are filled with foreboding [Ahnung(en)]. The future doesn't seem to hold anything for us except conflict, disruption, war.

There is a striking contrast between our state of mind and that of the British people. On Sept. 3, 1939, the first day of the war in England, Winston Churchill had this to say: »Outside the storms of war may blow and the land may be lashed [gepeitscht] with the fury [Raserei] of its gales [Stürme], but in our hearts this Sunday morning there is Peace.« Since Mr. Churchill spoke those words the

- 10 German Luftwaffe has made havoc [verheerende Schäden] of British cities, driven the population underground, frightened children from their sleep, and imposed [auferlegen(d)] upon everyone a nervous strain [Anspannung] as great as any that people have ever endured [ertragen]. Readers of *LIFE*⁴
15 have seen this havoc unfolded [ausgebreitet] week by week.

Yet close observers agree that when Mr. Churchill spoke of peace in the hearts of the British people he was not indulging [fröhnen] in idle [unnütz] oratory. The British people are profoundly [zutiefst] calm. There seems to be a complete absence of nervousness. It seems as if all the neuroses of modern life had vanished from England.

¹ **Presbyterianismus** (von griech. πρεσβύτερος [presbýteros] - der Ältere), der: Form der Kirchenverfassung, bei der die Kirche auf mehreren Ebenen durch Gremien von Ältesten und Pastoren geleitet wird. Die presbyterianische Kirchenverfassung steht zwischen dem hierarchischen Episkopalismus (von griech. ἐπίσκοπος [episkopos] - Vorsteher, Bischof; gemeint ist die Leitung durch Bischöfe) und dem Kongregationalismus (von lat. congregari - zusammentreffen), bei dem die Gemeinden völlig selbständig sind; sie ist besonders bei reformierten Kirchen gebräuchlich.

² Die **Hotchkiss School** ist eine der renommiertesten und materiell am besten gestellten High Schools in den USA; das Schulgeld beträgt aktuell (2019) 61.500 US-Dollar im Jahr. Die Schule finanziert sich aber wesentlich durch die Spenden ihrer wohlhabenden Absolventen. Sie wurde 1891 auf Betreiben des damaligen Präsidenten der Yale-Universität, Timothy Dwight V, von Maria H.B. Hotchkiss, der philanthropisch orientierten Witwe eines vermögenden Waffenfabrikanten, gegründet und war von Anfang an als *Preparatory-School* für die Yale-Universität konzipiert.

³ **Autoritarismus** (von lat. auctoritas - Einfluss, Geltung, Macht; Adj. autoritativ), der: gilt in der Politikwissenschaft als eine diktatorische Form der politischen Herrschaft. Gemeint sind in diesem Zusammenhang: das nationalsozialistische Deutschland, das faschistische Italien und das Japan der ersten Showa [Ära des erleuchteten Friedens]-Zeit (1926-1945), in der der junge Tenno (Gott-Kaiser) Hirohito (1901 [1926]-1989) unter dem Einfluss der führenden japanischen Militärs stand.

⁴ Das »**Life Magazine**« war eine US-amerikanische Zeitschrift (New York), die von 1883 bis 1972 wöchentlich, als »Special« bis 1978 und als Monatszeitschrift von 1978 bis 2000 veröffentlicht wurde. Während seiner goldenen Zeit, von 1936 bis 1972, war »Life« ein breit gefächertes Wochenmagazin, das die unterschiedlichsten Themen und Wissensgebiete ansprach und vor allem für die Qualität seiner Bildberichterstattung bekannt war.

In the beginning the British Government made elaborate preparations for an increase [Anwachsen] in mental breakdowns. But these have actually declined [zurückgewiesen]. There have been fewer than a dozen breakdowns reported in London since the air raids began.

5 The British are calm in their spirit not because they have nothing to worry about but because they are fighting for their lives. They have made that decision. And they have no further choice. All their mistakes of the past 20 years, all the stupidities and failures that they have shared with the rest of the democratic world, are now of the past. They can forget them because they are faced with a supreme task - defending, yard by yard, their island home.

10 With us it is different. We do not have to face any attack tomorrow or the next day. Yet we are faced with something almost as difficult. We are faced with great decisions.

We know how lucky we are compared to all the rest of mankind. At least two-thirds of us are just plain rich compared to all the rest of the human family - rich in food, rich in clothes, rich in entertainment and amusement, rich in leisure, rich.

15 And yet we also know that the sickness of the world is also our sickness. We, too, have miserably failed to solve the problems of our epoch. And nowhere in the world have man's failures been so little excusable as in the United States of America. Nowhere has the contrast been so great between the reasonable hopes of our age and the actual facts of failure and frustration. And so now all our failures and mistakes hover [schweben] like birds of ill omen [schlechtes Omen] over the White House, over the Capitol dome and over this printed page. Naturally, we have no peace. But, even
20 beyond this necessity for living with our own misdeeds, there is another reason why there is no peace in our hearts. It is that we have not been honest [ehrlich] with ourselves.

In this whole matter of War and Peace especially, we have been at various times and in various ways false to ourselves, false to each other, false to the facts of history and false to the future.

25 In this self-deceit [Selbstbetrug] our political leaders of all shades of opinion are deeply implicated. Yet we cannot shove [(ver)schieben] the blame off on them. If our leaders have deceived us it is mainly because we ourselves have insisted on being deceived. Their deceitfulness [Täuschungsbe-
reitschaft] has resulted from our own moral and intellectual confusion. In this confusion, our educa-
tors and churchmen and scientists are deeply implicated.

30 Journalists, too, of course, are implicated. But if Americans are confused it is not for lack [Fehlen] of accurate and pertinent [relevant] information. The American people are by far the best informed people in the history of the world. The trouble is not with the facts. The trouble is that clear and honest inferences [Rückschlüsse] have not been drawn from the facts. The day-to-day present [Alltags-
gegenwart] is clear. The issues of tomorrow are befogged [vernebelt].

35 There is one fundamental issue which faces America as it faces no other nation. It is an issue peculiar [insbesondere] to America and peculiar to America in the 20th Century - now. It is deeper even than the immediate issue of War. If America meets it correctly, then, despite hosts [Menge(n)] of dangers and difficulties, we can look forward and move forward to a future worthy of men, with peace in our hearts. If we dodge [ausweichen] the issue, we shall flounder [zappeln] for ten or 20 or 30 bitter years in a chartless [orientierungslos] and meaningless series of disasters.

40 The purpose of this article is to state [festzuhalten] that issue, and its solution, as candidly [klar] and as completely as possible. But first of all let us be completely candid about where we are and how we got there.

AMERICA IS IN THE WAR

... But are we in it?

45 Where are we? We are in the war. All this talk about whether this or that might or might not get us into the war is wasted effort [Anstrengung]. We are, for a fact, in the war.

If there's one place we Americans did not want to be, it was in the war. We didn't want much to be in any kind of war but, if there was one kind of war we most of all didn't want to be in, it was a Euro-
50 pean war. Yet, we're in a war, as vicious [bösaartig] and bad a war as ever struck [(ge)schlagen] this planet, and, along with being worldwide [obwohl weltumspannend], a European war.

Of course, we are not technically at war, we are not painfully at war, and we may never have to experience the full hell that war can be. Nevertheless the simple statement stands: we are in the war.

The irony is that Hitler knows it - and most Americans don't. It may or may not be an advantage to continue diplomatic relations with Germany. But the fact that a German embassy still flourishes in Washington beautifully illustrates the whole mass of deceits [*Täuschungen*] and self-deceits in which we have been living.

- 5 Perhaps the best way to show ourselves that we are in the war is to consider how we can get out of it. Practically, there's only one way to get out of it and that is by a German victory over England. If England should surrender soon, Germany and America would not start fighting the next day. So we would be out of the war. For a while. Except that Japan might then attack the South Seas and the Philippines. We could abandon [*zurücklassen, aufgeben*] the Philippines, abandon Australia and New Zealand, withdraw to Hawaii. And wait. We would be out of the war. We say we don't want to be in the war. We also say we want England to win. We want Hitler stopped - more than we want to stay out of the war. So, at the moment, we're in.

WE GOT IN VIA DEFENSE [*Wir sind durch die Verteidigung (hinein)geraten*]

... But what are we defending?

- 15 Now that we are in this war, how did we get in? We got in on the basis of defense. Even that very [*genau*] word, defense, has been full of deceit and self-deceit. To the average American the plain [*simplel*] meaning of the word defense is defense of the American territory. Is our national policy today limited to the defense of the American homeland by whatever means may seem wise? It is not. We are not in a war to defend American territory. We are in a war to defend and even to promote
- 20 [*befördern*], encourage [*ermutigen*] and incite [*anstacheln*] so-called democratic principles throughout [*überall*] the world. The average American begins to realize now that that's the kind of war he's in. And he's halfway for it. But he wonders how he ever got there, since a year ago he had not the slightest [*geringstes*] intention of getting into any such thing. Well, he can see now how he got there. He got there via »defense«.
- 25 Behind the doubts in the American mind there were and are two different picture-patterns [*Bildmuster*]. One of them stressing [*betonen*] the appalling [*entsetzlich*] consequences of the fall of England leads us to a war of intervention. As a plain matter of the defense of American territory is that picture necessarily true? It is not necessarily true.

- For the other picture is roughly [*grob (gesagt)*] this: while it would be much better for us if Hitler were severely [*schwer*] checked [*kontrolliert*], nevertheless regardless of what happens in Europe it would be entirely [*ganz und gar*] possible for us to organize a defense of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere so that this country could not be successfully attacked. You are familiar [*vertraut*] with that picture. Is it true or false? No man is qualified to state [*festzustellen*] categorically that it is false. If the entire rest of the world came under the organized domination of evil tyrants, it
- 35 is quite possible to imagine that this country could make itself such a tough [*hart*] nut to crack that not all the tyrants in the world would care to come against us. And of course there would always be a better than even chance that, like the great Queen Elizabeth, we could play one tyrant off against another. Or, like an infinitely [*unendlich*] mightier Switzerland, we could live discreetly and dangerously in the midst of enemies. No man can say that that picture of America as an impregnable [*un-
einnehmbar*] armed camp is false. No man can honestly say that as a pure matter of defense - defense of our homeland - it is necessary to get into or be in this war. The question before us then is not primarily one of necessity and survival. It is a question of choice and calculation. The true questions are: Do we want to be in this war? Do we prefer [*vorziehen*] to be in it? And, if so, for what?

WE OBJECT [*einwenden*] **TO BEING IN IT**

- 45 ... Our fears have a special cause

We are in this war. We can see how we got into it in terms of defense. Now why do we object so strongly to being in it?

- There are lots of reasons. First, there is the profound and almost universal aversion to all war - to killing and being killed. But the reason which needs closest inspection, since it is one peculiar to this war and never felt about any previous war, is the fear that if we get into this war, it will be the end of our constitutional democracy. We are all acquainted [*bekannt*] with the fearful forecast - that
- 50 some form of dictatorship is required to fight a modern war, that we will certainly [*bestimmt*] go

bankrupt, that in the process of war and its aftermath [*Nachwirkung(en)*] our economy will be largely socialized, that the politicians now in office will seize [*ergreifen*] complete power and never yield it up [*aufgeben*], and that what with the whole trend toward collectivism, we shall end up in such a total national socialism that any faint [*schwach*] semblances [*Anschein*] of our constitutional
5 American democracy will be totally unrecognizable. We start into this war with huge Government debt, a vast [*unermesslich*] bureaucracy and a whole generation of young people trained to look to the Government as the source of all life. The Party in power is the one which for long years has been most sympathetic [*Verständnis*] to all manner [*Art(en)*] of socialist doctrines [*Lehren*] and collectivist trends.

10 The President of the United States has continually reached [*gestrebt*] for more and more power, and he owes [hier: *verdankt*] his continuation [*Fortsetzung*] in office today largely to the coming of the war. Thus [*so*], the fear that the United States will be driven to a national socialism, as a result of cataclysmic [*umwälzend*] circumstances and contrary [*im Widerspruch*] to the free will of the American people, is an entirely [*völlig*] justifiable [*gerechtfertigt*] fear.

15 **BUT WE WILL WIN IT**

... The big question is how

So there's the mess [hier: *Schwierigkeit*] - to date. Much more could be said in amplification [*zur Erläuterung*], in qualification [*Kennzeichnung*], and in argument [hier: *zur Beweisführung*]. But, however elaborately [*aufwendig*] they might be stated, the sum of the facts about our present position
20 brings us to this point - that the paramount question [*entscheidende Frage*] of this immediate [*unmittelbar*] moment is not whether we get into war but how do we win it?

If we are in a war, then it is no little advantage to be aware of the fact. And once we admit to ourselves we are in a war, there is no shadow of doubt that we Americans will be determined to win it - cost what it may in life or treasure. Whether or not we declare war, whether or not we send expeditionary forces abroad [*in das Ausland*], whether or not we go bankrupt in the process - all these tremendous considerations [*gewaltige Überlegungen*] are matters of strategy and management and are secondary to the overwhelming importance of winning the war.

25 **WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?**

... And why we need to know

30 Having now, with candor [*mit Offenheit*], examined our position, it is time to consider, to better purpose than would have been possible before, the larger issue which confronts us. Stated most simply, and in general terms, that issue is: What are we fighting for?

Each of us stands ready to give our life, our wealth, and all our hope of personal happiness, to make sure that America shall not lose any war she is engaged in. But we would like to know what war we
35 are trying to win - and what we are supposed to win when we win it.

This questioning reflects our truest instincts as Americans. But more than that. Our urgent desire to give this war its proper name [*den richtigen Namen*] has a desperate practical importance. If we know what we are fighting for, then we can drive confidently toward a victorious conclusion and, what's more, have at least an even chance of establishing a workable Peace.

40 Furthermore - and this is an extraordinary and profoundly historical fact which deserves to be examined in detail - America and only America can effectively state [*geben = definieren*] the war aims of this war.

Almost every expert will agree that Britain cannot win complete victory - cannot even, in the common saying, »*Stop Hitler*« - without American help. Therefore, even if Britain should from time to time announce war aims, the American people are continually in the position of effectively approving [*billigen*] or not approving those aims. On the contrary, if America were to announce war aims, Great Britain would almost certainly accept them. And the entire world including Adolf Hitler would accept them as the gauge of this battle [*in der ganzen Breite dieser Auseinandersetzung*].

45 Americans have a feeling that in any collaboration with Great Britain we are somehow playing Britain's game and not our own. Whatever sense there may have been in this notion in the past [*Welcher Sinn auch immer in diesem Begriffsverständnis in der Vergangenheit lag ...*], today it is an ignorant and foolish conception of the situation. In any sort of partnership with the British Empire, Great

Britain is perfectly willing that the United States of America should assume [einnehmen = innehaben] the role of senior partner. This has been true for a long time. Among serious Englishmen, the chief complaint against America (and incidentally their best alibi for themselves) has really amounted to this - that America has refused to rise to the opportunities of leadership in the world [Amerika hat sich geweigert, sich den Möglichkeiten der führenden Weltmacht zu stellen].

Consider this recent statement of the *London Economist*⁵:

»If any permanent closer association of Britain and the United States is achieved, an island people of less than 50 millions cannot expect to be the senior partner ... The center of gravity and the ultimate decision must increasingly lie in America. We cannot resent this historical development. We may rather feel proud that the cycle of dependence, enmity [Feindschaft] and independence is coming full circle into a new interdependence.«

We Americans no longer have the alibi that we cannot have things the way we want them so far as Great Britain is concerned. With due regard [Mit gebührender Berücksichtigung ...] for the varying problems of the members of the British Commonwealth, what we want will be okay with them. This holds true even [Dies gilt auch für ...] for that inspiring proposal called *Union Now* - a proposal, made by an American, that Britain and the United States should create a new and larger federal union of peoples. That may not be the right approach to our problem. But no thoughtful American has done his duty by the United States of America until he has read and pondered Clarence Streit's⁶ book presenting that proposal.

The big, important point to be made here is simply that the complete opportunity of leadership is ours. Like most great creative opportunities, it is an opportunity enveloped in stupendous difficulties and dangers. If we don't want it, if we refuse to take it, the responsibility of refusal is also ours, and ours alone. Admittedly [Zugegeben, ...], the future of the world cannot be settled all in one piece. It is stupid to try to blueprint the future as you blueprint an engine or as you draw up a constitution for a sorority [Verschwisterung]. But if our trouble is that we don't know what we are fighting for, then it's up to us to figure it out. Don't expect some other country to tell us. Stop this Nazi propaganda about fighting somebody else's war. We fight no wars except our wars. »Arsenal of Democracy?«⁷ We may prove to be that. But today we must be the arsenal of America and of the friends and allies of America.

Friends and allies of America? Who are they, and for what? This is for us to tell them.

DONG DANG⁸ OR DEMOCRACY

... But whose Dong Dang, whose Democracy?

But how can we tell them? And how can we tell ourselves for what purposes we seek allies and for what purposes we fight? Are we going to fight for dear old Danzig⁹ or dear old Dong Dang? Are we

⁵ *The [London] Economist* ist eine internationale Wochenzeitung, die im Magazinformat veröffentlicht wird und sich mit aktuellen Themen, internationaler Wirtschaft, Politik und Technologie beschäftigt. Die 1843 gegründete Zeitung mit Sitz in London ist im Besitz der *The Economist Group*, mit Zentralen Redaktionen in den Vereinigten Staaten sowie in großen Städten Kontinentaleuropas, Asiens und des Nahen Ostens.

⁶ **Clarence Kirschmann Streit (1896-1986)**, US-amerikanischer Journalist, der eine herausragende Rolle in den atlantischen und weltföderalistischen Bewegungen spielte. Streit arbeitete nach seinem Studium, während des 1. Weltkrieges, im Nachrichtendienst der US-Army und gehörte während der Pariser Friedensverhandlungen 1919 der US-Delegation an. In den 20er Jahren war er als Europa-Korrespondent der *New York Times* tätig, seit 1929 verfolgte er als Berichterstatter in Genf den allmählichen Niedergang des *Völkerbundes*. Das brachte ihn dazu, sich für eine politische Föderation aller westlichen Demokratien unter der Führung der USA einzusetzen. Sein darauf gerichtetes Engagement gipfelte in der Veröffentlichung eines Manifestes mit dem Titel *Union Now* (1939).

⁷ »*Arsenal of Democracy*« (»*Arsenal der Demokratie*«) war ein von US-Präsident Franklin D. Roosevelt geprägter Slogan, der in einer Radiosendung vom 29.12.1940, in der dieser versprochen hatte, dem Vereinigten Königreich im Kampf gegen Nazi-Deutschland zu beizustehen, indem die USA ihnen - als »*Arsenal der Demokratie*« - militärische Hilfsgüter zur Verfügung stellen, während sie sich selbst aus den eigentlichen Konflikten heraushielten.

⁸ **Dong Dang**: Stadt im Norden Vietnams (1940: Französisch Indochina, Provinz Tonkin) an der Grenze zum japanisch besetzten Teil Chinas. Im September 1940 überfielen die Japaner die Stadt (trotz einer zuvor getroffenen Neutralitäts-Vereinbarung mit dem deutschfreundlichen Vichy-Regime [»*Etat Française*«] unter General Pétain) und begannen von hier aus mit der systematischen Durchdringung des französischen Kolonialgebietes.

⁹ **Danzig (polnisch Gdansk)**: Stadt an der polnischen Ostseeküste; von 1920 bis 1939 gewissermaßen freier Stadtstaat unter dem Mandat des Völkerbundes. Mit dem Beschuss der *Westerplatte* (polnisches Befestigungswerk am Rande des Hafens von Danzig) durch das deutsche Marine-Schulschiff *Schleswig-Holstein* am frühen Morgen des 1. September 1939 begann der 2.

going to decide the boundaries of Ruritania¹⁰? Or, if we cannot state war aims in terms of vastly [erheblich] distant geography, shall we use some big words like Democracy and Freedom and Justice? Yes, we can use the big words. The President has already used them. And perhaps we had better get used to using them again. Maybe they do mean something - about the future as well as the past.

- 5 Some amongst us are likely to be dying for them - on the fields and in the skies of battle. Either that, or the words themselves and what they mean die with us - in our beds.

- But is there nothing between the absurd sound of distant cities and the brassy [blechern] trumpeting of majestic words? And if so, whose Dong Dang and whose Democracy? Is there not something a little more practically satisfying that we can get our teeth into? Is there no sort of understandable program? A program which would be clearly good for America, which would make sense for America - and which at the same time might have the blessing of the Goddess of Democracy and even help somehow to fix up this bothersome matter [lästige Sache] of Dong Dang? Is there none such? There is. And so we now come squarely and closely face to face with the issue which Americans hate most to face. It is that old, old issue with those old, old battered labels - the issue of Isolationism versus Internationalism. We detest [verabscheuen] both words. We spit them at each other [Wir spucken sie gegeneinander ...] with the fury of hissing geese [mit der Wut zischender Gänse]. We duck and dodge them.

- Let us face that issue squarely now. If we face it squarely now - and if in facing it we take full and fearless account of the realities of our age - then we shall open the way, not necessarily to peace in our daily lives but to peace in our hearts.

Life is made up of joy and sorrow, of satisfactions and difficulties. In this time of trouble, we speak of troubles. There are many troubles. There are troubles in the field of philosophy, in faith [Glauben] and morals. There are troubles of home and family, of personal life. All are interrelated but we speak here especially of the troubles of national policy.

- 25 In the field of national policy, the fundamental trouble with America has been, and is, that whereas their nation became in the 20th Century the most powerful and the most vital nation in the world, nevertheless Americans were unable to accommodate themselves [sich in Beziehung setzen] spiritually and practically to that fact. Hence [Daher ...] they have failed to play their part as a world power - a failure which has had disastrous consequences for themselves and for all mankind. And the cure [Heilung/Lösung] is this: to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world [um auf die Welt auszuüben] the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit [wie wir es für richtig halten] and by such means as we see fit.

- 30 »For such purposes as we see fit« leaves entirely open the question of what our purposes may be or how we may appropriately achieve them. Emphatically our only alternative to isolationism is not to undertake to police the whole world [es auf sich zu nehmen, die ganze Welt polizeilich zu betreuen] nor to impose democratic institutions on all mankind including the Dalai Lama¹¹ and the good shepherds of Tibet.

Weltkrieg in Europa. Am 3. September 1939 erklärten Großbritannien und Frankreich, die Garantiemächte Polens, Deutschland den Krieg. Es kam jedoch zunächst (bis zum 10. Mai 1940, an dem die deutsche West-Offensive begann) zu keinerlei nennenswerten Kampfhandlungen an der deutsch-französischen Grenze (»La drôle de guerre« [»Der komische Krieg«]). Die deutsche Luftwaffe warf über den grenznahen französischen Städten Flugblätter ab, die den Franzosen die Berechtigung des deutschen Vorgehens in Polen erläutern sollten, das vermeintlich nur auf die Beseitigung des sogenannten »polnischen Korridors« (polnisches Territorium zwischen West- und Ostpreußen) und der Reintegration Danzigs in das Reichsgebiet zielte. Überschrieben war dieser Text mit der Fragestellung: »Pour Danzig mourir?« (»Für Danzig sterben?«). Diese Formel greift Luce rhetorisch auf.

¹⁰ Ruritanien ist ein fiktives Königreich in Mitteleuropa, das zuerst als Ort der Handlung des Abenteuerromans *Der Gefangene von Zenda* (1894) des Briten Anthony Hope bekannt wurde.

¹¹ Dalai Lama (Tibetisch, häufig mit »Ozeangleicher Lehrer« übersetzt), Titel des höchsten Trülku (»lebender Buddha«) innerhalb der Hierarchie der Gelug-Schule (»Schule der Tugendhaften«) des tibetischen Buddhismus. Er wurde erstmals 1578 als Ehrentitel vom mongolischen Fürsten Altan Khan (1507-1582) an seinen spirituellen Lehrer Sönam Gyatsho verliehen. Der Dalai Lama wird im tibetischen Buddhismus als Bodhisattva verstanden, als erleuchtetes Wesen, das aus Mitgefühl reinkarnierte, das heißt: bewusst wieder in - beispielsweise - die menschliche Existenz eintrat. Dalai Lamas gelten als Emanationen Avalokiteshvaras (tib. *spyan ras gzigs*; Chenresig), des Bodhisattva des Mitgefühls, der auf der Erde als Mensch auftritt (siehe dazu auch: Nirmāṇakāya).

America cannot be responsible for the good behavior of the entire world. But America is responsible, to herself as well as to history, for the world environment in which she lives. Nothing can so vitally affect America's environment as America's own influence upon it, and therefore if America's environment is unfavorable to the growth of American life, then America has nobody to blame so deeply as she must blame herself. In its failure to grasp this relationship [*diese Beziehung zu erfassen*] between America and America's environment lies the moral and practical bankruptcy of any and all forms of isolationism. It is most unfortunate that this virus of isolationist sterility has so deeply infected an influential section of the Republican Party. For until the Republican Party can develop a vital philosophy and program for America's initiative and activity as a world power, it will continue to cut itself off from any useful participation in this hour of history. And its participation is deeply needed for the shaping of the future [*für die Gestaltung der Zukunft*] of America and of the world.

But politically speaking, it is an equally serious fact [*eine ebenso ernste Tatsache*] that for seven years Franklin Roosevelt¹² was, for all practical purposes [*im Hinblick auf alle praktischen Ziele*], a complete isolationist. He was more of an isolationist than Herbert Hoover¹³ or Calvin Coolidge¹⁴. The

¹² **Franklin Delano Roosevelt** (1882-1945), oft mit seinen Initialen **FDR** abgekürzt: von 1933 bis zu seinem Tod 1945 der 32. Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten. Er gehörte der Demokratischen Partei an. Bei der US-Präsidentenwahl am 2. November 1920 kandidierte er als *Running Mate* von James M. Cox für das Amt des US-Vizepräsidenten; sie verloren die Wahl. Im August 1921 erkrankte er an Kinderlähmung; er war fortan von der Hüfte ab weitgehend gelähmt und konnte kaum selbstständig gehen. Roosevelt nahm 1928 seine politische Karriere wieder auf und wurde bei der *New York state election* am 6. November 1928 zum Gouverneur des Bundesstaates gewählt. Dieses Amt übte er von 1929 bis 1932 aus und konnte dort wichtige Reformen zur Bekämpfung der *Great Depression* umsetzen. Als Präsidentschaftskandidat seiner Partei bei der Wahl von 1932 besiegte er den Amtsinhaber Herbert Hoover deutlich. Nach seiner ersten Amtszeit wurde er 1936, 1940 und 1944 wiedergewählt - er ist damit der einzige US-Präsident, der länger als zwei Wahlperioden amtierte. Seine Präsidentschaft ist durch innenpolitische Reformen unter dem Schlagwort *New Deal* zur Bekämpfung der Weltwirtschaftskrise geprägt. Seine Politik setzte die Leitlinie zum regulierenden Eingreifen der amerikanischen Regierung ins wirtschaftliche Geschehen, um bestimmte, im allgemeinen Interesse bestehende Ziele durchzusetzen. Zudem brachten die Einführung der Sozialversicherung und eines bundesweiten Mindestlohns nachhaltige Veränderungen im Sozialwesen des Landes mit sich. Das bedeutendste außenpolitische Ereignis war die nach dem japanischen Überfall auf Pearl Harbor im Dezember 1941 erfolgende Kriegserklärung Deutschlands und Italiens an die Vereinigten Staaten, die zum Eintritt der Vereinigten Staaten in den Zweiten Weltkrieg führte. Roosevelt widmete sich trotz der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Gegensätze zur Sowjetunion aktiv dem Aufbau der Anti-Hitler-Koalition und hatte entscheidenden Anteil an der Definition der alliierten Kriegsziele gegen die Achsenmächte. Unter seiner Führung erfuhr die bis dahin überwiegend isolationistische US-Außenpolitik eine neue Ausrichtung hin zum Internationalismus. Mit seiner Politik versuchte Roosevelt, anstelle eines Nationalismus dem Gedanken der globalen *Abhängigkeit aller von allen* Geltung zu verschaffen.

¹³ **Herbert Clark Hoover** (1874-1964), US-amerikanischer Politiker der Republikanischen Partei, von 1929 bis 1933 der 31. Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten. Nach seinem Sieg bei der Präsidentschaftswahl 1928 waren mit seinem Amtsantritt optimistische Erwartungen verbunden. Mit dem Einsetzen der Weltwirtschaftskrise, die in Amerika zur *Great Depression* und Massenverelendung führte, und seinen als mitleidlos wahrgenommenen politischen Gegenmaßnahmen sank seine Popularität rapide, so dass er bei der Präsidentschaftswahl 1932 gegen Franklin D. Roosevelt keine Chance hatte. Außenpolitisch agierte Hoover zwar äußerst zurückhaltend, aber auch sehr konstruktiv: Die Hoover-Administration unternahm große Anstrengungen, um das Verhältnis der USA zu den lateinamerikanischen und karibischen Staaten zu verbessern, indem sie die vertraglichen Beziehungen zu ihnen auf der Basis ausgeglichener Beziehungen neu zu regeln versuchte und damit die Grundlagen für die von Roosevelt betriebene »*Good-Neighbour-Policy*« gegenüber der lateinamerikanischen Staatenwelt legte. Hoovers Erklärung vom Juni 1931, die intergouvernementalen Zahlungsverpflichtungen wegen der Weltwirtschaftskrise für ein Jahr auszusetzen, bedeutete nicht nur eine Suspendierung der deutschen Reparationszahlungen an die europäischen Siegermächte des Ersten Weltkriegs, sondern auch einen Aufschub für die Rückzahlung der interalliierten Kriegsschulden, die Großbritannien und insbesondere Frankreich während des Weltkriegs bei den USA aufgenommen hatten und die sie mit ihren Reparationseinnahmen zurückzahlten. Damit leisteten die USA einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Überwindung der Wirtschaftskrise in Europa.

¹⁴ **John Calvin Coolidge, Jr.** (1872-1933), US-amerikanischer Politiker der Republikanischen Partei und von 1923 bis 1929 der 30. Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten. Coolidge setzte in der Außenpolitik auf die Erhaltung der wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Vorrangstellung der USA. Mit dem Dawes-Plan gelang Coolidge und seinem Außenminister Charles Evans Hughes 1924 eine Neuregelung der deutschen Kriegsschulden. 1926 ließ er während der *Guerra Constitucionalista* (nach einem Militärputsch 1925 ausgebrochener Bürgerkrieg zwischen Liberalen und Konservativen) amerikanische Marineinfanterie in Nicaragua intervenieren (1926). Diese zweite Militärintervention in Nicaragua sollte bis 1933 andauern. Auch die Besetzung Haitis wurde unter seiner Ägide fortgesetzt. Unter Coolidge stiegen die Direktinvestitionen in Südamerika weiter an und erhöhten die wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit dieser Region von den Vereinigten Staaten. 1928 unterzeichnete Coolidges Außenminister Frank Billings Kellogg den Briand-Kellogg-Pakt, einen Kriegsächtungspakt. An der Wirksamkeit dieses Vertrags hatte er selber Zweifel und maß ihm vor allem symbolische Bedeutung zu. Trotzdem erhielt mit Kellogg der zweite Angehörige seiner Regierung den Friedensnobelpreis, nachdem ihn zuvor Charles Gates Dawes erhalten hatte.

fact that Franklin Roosevelt has recently emerged [*hat sich unlängst erwiesen*] as an emergency world leader should not obscure [*verschleiern*] the fact that for seven years his policies ran absolutely counter to any possibility of effective American leadership in international co-operation. There is of course a justification [*Rechtfertigung*] which can be made for the President's first two terms. It can be said, with reason, that great social reforms were necessary in order to bring democracy up-to-date in the greatest of democracies. But the fact is that Franklin Roosevelt failed to make American democracy work successfully on a narrow [*schmal*], materialistic and nationalistic basis. And under Franklin Roosevelt we ourselves have failed to make democracy work successfully. Our only chance now to make it work is in terms of a vital international economy and in terms of an international moral order. This objective [*Ziel*] is Franklin Roosevelt's great opportunity to justify his first two terms and to go down in history as the greatest rather than the last of American Presidents. Our job is to help in every way we can, for our sakes and our children's sakes, to ensure that Franklin Roosevelt shall be justly hailed [*zurecht bejubelt*] as America's greatest President.

Without our help he cannot be our greatest President. With our help he can and will be. Under him and with his leadership we can make isolationism as dead an issue as slavery, and we can make a truly American internationalism something as natural to us in our time as the airplane or the radio. In 1919 we had a golden opportunity, an opportunity unprecedented [*beispiellos*] in all history, to assume the leadership of the world - a golden opportunity handed to us on the proverbial [*sprichwörtlich*] silver platter. We did not understand that opportunity.

Wilson mishandled it. We rejected it. The opportunity persisted [*blieb erhalten*]. We bungled it [*Wir haben es verpfuscht*] in the 1920's and in the confusions of the 1930's we killed it. To lead the world would never have been an easy task. To revive [*wiederbeleben*] the hope of that lost opportunity makes the task now infinitely harder [*unendlich härter*] than it would have been before. Nevertheless, with the help of all of us, Roosevelt must succeed where Wilson failed.

25 THE 20TH CENTURY IS THE AMERICAN CENTURY

... Some facts about our time

Consider the 20th Century. It is [ours] not only in the sense that we happen to live in it [*Nicht nur in dem Sinne, dass zufällig darin leben ...*] but ours also because it is America's first century as a dominant power in the world. So far, this century of ours has been a profound and tragic disappointment.

No other century has been so big with promise for human progress and happiness. And in no one century have so many men and women and children suffered such pain and anguish [*Angst*] and bitter death. It is a baffling [*verwirrend*] and difficult and paradoxical century. No doubt all centuries were paradoxical to those who had to cope [*bewältigen*] with them. But, like everything else, our paradoxes today are bigger and better than ever. Yes, better as well as bigger - inherently better.

We have poverty and starvation [*Hunger*] - but only in the midst of plenty. We have the biggest wars in the midst of the most widespread, the deepest and the most articulate hatred [*Hass*] of war in all history. We have tyrannies and dictatorships - but only when democratic idealism, once regarded as the dubious eccentricity of a colonial nation [*einstmals betrachtet als zweifelhafte Exzentrik eine Kolonial-Nation*], is the faith [*Glaube*] of a huge majority of the people of the world.

And ours is also a revolutionary century. The paradoxes make it inevitably [*unweigerlich*] revolutionary. Revolutionary, of course, in science and in industry. And also revolutionary, as a corollary in politics [*Folge der Politik*] and the structure of society. But to say that a revolution is in progress is not to say that the men with either the craziest ideas or the angriest ideas or the most plausible ideas are going to come out on top. The Revolution of 1776 was won and established by men most of whom appear to have been both gentlemen and men of common sense. Clearly a revolutionary epoch signifies great changes, great adjustments [*Anpassungen*]. And this is only one reason why it is really so foolish for people to worry about our »constitutional democracy« without worrying or, better, thinking hard about the world revolution. For only as we go out to meet and solve for our time the problems of the world revolution, can we know how to re-establish our constitutional democracy for another 50 or 100 years. This 20th Century is baffling, difficult, paradoxical, revolutionary. But by now, at the cost of much pain and many hopes deferred [*aufgeschobene Hoffnungen*], we know a good deal about it. And we ought to accommodate [hier: *einsetzen*] our outlook [Perspektive] to this knowledge so dearly bought [*so teuer erworben*]. For example, any true conception of our world of the 20th Century [*jede wirkliche Vortellung von unserer Welt des 20. Jahrhunderts*]

must surely include a vivid awareness [*lebendiges Bewusstsein*] of at least [*mindestens*] these four propositions [*Grundsätze*].

First: our world of 2,000,000,000 human beings is for the first time in history one world, fundamentally indivisible.

- 5 Second: modern man hates war and feels intuitively that, in its present scale [*Dimension*] and frequency [*Häufigkeit*], it may even be fatal to his species.

Third: our world, again for the first time in human history, is capable of producing all the material needs of the entire human family.

- 10 Fourth: the world of the 20th Century, if it is to come to life [*wenn es zum Leben erweckt werden soll*] in any nobility [*in jeder Größe*] of health and vigor, must be to a significant degree [*in einem erheblichen Maße*] an American Century.

As to the first and second: in postulating the indivisibility of the contemporary world, one does not necessarily imagine that anything like a world state - a parliament of men - must be brought about in this century. Nor need we assume [*Noch brauchen wir anzunehmen ...*] that war can be abolished [*abschaffen*]. All that it is necessary to feel - and to feel deeply - is that terrific forces of magnetic attraction [*Anziehung*] and repulsion [*Abstoßung*] will operate as between every large group of human beings on this planet. Large sections of the human family may be effectively organized into opposition to each other. Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space. But Freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and among many peoples. As to the third point - the promise of adequate production for all mankind, the »more abundant life« [*mehr reicheres Leben*] - be it noted that this is characteristically an American promise. It is a promise easily made, here and elsewhere, by demagogues and proponents [*Befürworter*] of all manner of slick schemes [glatte Schemata¹⁵] and »planned economies«. What we must insist on is that the abundant life is predicated [*begründet*] on Freedom - on the Freedom which has created its possibility - on a vision of Freedom under Law. Without Freedom, there will be no abundant life. With Freedom, there can be. And finally there is the belief - shared let us remember by most men living - that the 20th Century must be to a significant degree [*in einem bedeutenden Maße*] an American Century. This knowledge calls us to action now.

AMERICA'S VISION OF OUR WORLD

... How it shall be created

- 35 What can we say and foresee about an American Century? It is meaningless merely [*nahezu bedeutungslos*] to say that we reject isolationism and accept the logic of internationalism. What internationalism? Rome had a great internationalism. So had the Vatican¹⁶ and Genghis Khan and the Ottoman Turks¹⁷ and the Chinese Emperors and 19th Century England. After the first World War, Lenin had one in mind. Today Hitler seems to have one in mind - one which appeals strongly to some

¹⁵ **Schema** (von griech. σχήμα [*skhēma*], Pl. σχήματα [*skhēmata*] - *Haltung, Gestalt, Form*), das/ein; Pl. Schemata (bzw. Schemen), die: steht für: Struktur, Entwurf, Plan, Schablone, Denkmuster usw.

¹⁶ Vatikan (= Vatikanstadt bzw. -staat), der: römischer Stadtteil, benannt nach seinem geografischen Bezugspunkt, dem auf dem linken Tiber-Ufer liegenden *Mons Vaticanus*; der Vatikan(staat) steht für das römisch-katholische Papsttum bzw. die Römisch-Katholische Kirche (von griech. καθολικός [*katholikós*] - *allumfassend*).

¹⁷ Das **Osmanische Reich** war das Reich der Dynastie der Osmanen von ca. 1299 bis 1922. Die im deutschsprachigen Raum veraltete, in der englisch- und französischsprachigen Literatur noch anzutreffende Bezeichnung **Ottomanisches Reich** leitet sich von Varianten der arabischen Namensform Uthman des Dynastiebegründers Osman I. her. Das Reich entstand Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts als regionaler Herrschaftsbereich im nordwestlichen Kleinasien im Grenzgebiet des byzantinischen Reichs unter einem Anführer mutmaßlich nomadischer Herkunft. Dieser löste sich aus der Abhängigkeit vom Sultanat der Rum-Seldschuken, welches nach 1243 unter die Vorherrschaft des mongolischen Ilchanats geraten war und seine Macht eingebüßt hatte. Hauptstadt war ab 1326 Bursa, ab 1368 Adrianopel, schließlich seit 1453 Konstantinopel (osmanisch *Kostantiniyye*; seit 1876 offiziell Istanbul genannt). Zur Zeit seiner größten Ausdehnung im 17. Jahrhundert erstreckte es sich von seinen Kernlanden Kleinasien und Rumelien nordwärts bis in das Gebiet um das Schwarze und das Asowsche Meer, westwärts bis weit nach Südosteuropa hinein; darüberhinaus beherrschten die Osmanen den gesamten arabischen Nahen Osten sowie die arabische Halbinsel bis zum Jemen.

American isolationists whose opinion of Europe is so low that they would gladly hand it over to anyone who would guarantee to destroy it forever. But what internationalism have we Americans to offer?

5 Ours cannot come out of the vision of any one man. It must be the product of the imaginations of many men. It must be a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills. It must be an internationalism of the people, by the people and for the people.

10 In general, the issues which the American people champion revolve [für die sich das amerikanische Volk einsetzt] around their determination to make the society of men safe for the freedom, growth and increasing satisfaction [steigende Zufriedenheit] of all individual men. Beside that resolve [Gemessen daran], the sneers [Hohngelächter], groans [Stöhnen], catcalls [Katzengejammer], teeth-grinding [Zähneknirschen], hisses [Zischlaute] and roars [Brüllen] of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry are of small moment.

15 Once we cease [wir hören auf] to distract [auseinanderzusetzen] ourselves with lifeless arguments about isolationism, we shall be amazed to discover that there is already an immense American internationalism. American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common. Blindly, unintentionally, accidentally and really in spite of ourselves, we are already a world power in all the trivial ways - in very human ways. But there is a great deal more
20 than that. America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world.

Americans - Midwestern Americans - are today the least [die am wenigsten] provincial people in the world. They have traveled the most and they know more about the world than the people of any other country. America's worldwide experience in commerce is also far greater than most of us realize. Most important of all, we have that indefinable, unmistakable sign of leadership: prestige. And
25 unlike the prestige of Rome or Genghis Khan¹⁸ or 19th Century England, American prestige throughout the world is faith in the good intentions as well as in the ultimate intelligence and ultimate strength of the whole American people. We have lost some of that prestige in the last few years. But most of it is still there.

30 No narrow definition can be given to the American internationalism of the 20th Century. It will take shape, as all civilizations take shape, by the living of it, by work and effort, by trial and error, by enterprise and adventure and experience.

And by imagination!

35 As America enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a vision of America as a world power which is authentically American and which can inspire us to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm. And as we come now to the great test, it may yet turn out that in all our trials and tribulations of spirit [Bedrängnissen des Geistes] during the first part of this century we as a people have been painfully apprehending [erkannt haben] the meaning of our time and now in this moment of testing there may come clear at last the vision which will guide us to the authentic creation of the 20th Century - our Century.

40 Consider four areas of life and thought in which we may seek to realize such a vision:

First, the economic. It is for America and for America alone to determine whether a system of free economic enterprise - an economic order compatible with freedom and progress - shall or shall not prevail [durchsetzen] in this century. We know perfectly well that there is not the slightest [geringste]
45 chance of anything faintly resembling [ähnelte] a free economic system prevailing in this country if it prevails nowhere else. What then does America have to decide?

¹⁸ **Dschingis Khan** (ca. 1155-1227) war ein Khagan (Titel der dem Status eines Kaisers entspricht) der Mongolen und Begründer des Mongolischen Reichs. Er vereinte die mongolischen Stämme auf dem Territorium der heutigen zentralen und nördlichen Mongolei und führte sie zum Sieg gegen mehrere benachbarte Völker. Nach der Ernennung zum Khagan aller Mongolen begann er mit der Eroberung weiterer Gebiete; im Osten bis an das Japanische Meer und im Westen bis zum Kaspischen Meer. Um dieses Reich zu verwalten, ließ er eine eigene Schrift entwickeln und setzte schriftliche und für alle verbindliche Gesetze durch. Nach seinem Tod wurde das Reich unter seinen Söhnen aufgeteilt und noch weiter vergrößert, fiel aber zwei Generationen später wieder auseinander.

Some few decisions are quite simple. For example: we have to decide whether or not we shall have for ourselves and our friends freedom of the seas - the right to go with our ships and our ocean-going airplanes where we wish, when we wish and as we wish. The vision of America as the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination [*die Fanatasie zu begrenzen*]. Let us not be staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities [*enorme Möglichkeiten*].

Our thinking of world trade today is on ridiculously small terms. For example, we think of Asia as being worth only a few hundred millions a year to us. Actually, in the decades to come Asia will be worth to us exactly zero - or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year. And the latter are the terms [*letzte sind die Begriffe ...*] we must think in, or else confess a pitiful impotence [*oder eine klägliche Impotenz eingestehen*]. Closely akin [*verwandt*] to the purely economic area and yet quite different from it, there is the picture of an America which will send out through the world its technical and artistic skills. Engineers, scientists, doctors, movie men, makers of entertainment, developers of airlines, builders of roads, teachers, educators.

Throughout the world, these skills, this training, this leadership is needed and will be eagerly [*eifrig*] welcomed, if only we have the imagination to see it and the sincerity [*Aufrichtigkeit*] and good will to create the world of the 20th Century. But now there is a third thing which our vision must immediately be concerned with. We must undertake now to be the Good Samaritan of the entire world. It is the manifest duty [*offensichtliche Pflicht*] of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world who as a result of this worldwide collapse of civilization are hungry and destitute [*mittellos*] - all of them, that is, whom we can from time to time reach consistently [*konsequent*] with a very tough attitude toward all hostile governments.

For every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime [= 10 Cent] in a gigantic effort to feed the world - and all the world should know that we have dedicated ourselves to this task. Every farmer in America should be encouraged to produce all the crops [*Kulturen*] he can, and all that we cannot eat - and perhaps some of us could eat less - should forthwith [*unverzüglich*] be dispatched to the four quarters of the globe as a free gift, administered by a humanitarian army of Americans, to every man, woman and child on this earth who is really hungry.

But all this is not enough. All this will fail and none of it will happen unless our vision of America as a world power includes a passionate devotion to great American ideals. We have some things in this country which are infinitely precious and especially American - a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity [*Chancengleichheit*], a tradition of self-reliance [*Selbstständigkeit*] and independence and also of co-operation. In addition to ideals and notions which are especially American, we are the inheritors [*Erben*] of all the great principles of Western civilization - above all Justice, the love of Truth, the ideal of Charity. The other day Herbert Hoover said that America was fast becoming the sanctuary of the ideals of civilization.

For the moment it may be enough to be the sanctuary [*das Heiligtum zu sein*] of these ideals. But not for long. It now becomes our time to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.

America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise [*immer breitere Sphäre der Unternehmung*], America as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than to receive [*gesegneter zu geben als zu empfangen*], and America as the powerhouse [*Kraftwerk*] of the ideals of Freedom and Justice - out of these elements surely can be fashioned [*kann gestaltet werden*] a vision of the 20th Century to which we can and will devote [*der wir uns widmen können*] ourselves in joy and gladness and vigor [*Stärke*] and enthusiasm.

Other nations can survive simply because they have endured so long - sometimes with more and sometimes with less significance [*Bedeutung*]. But this nation, conceived in adventure [*in einem Abenteuer entworfen*] and dedicated to the progress of man [*Mensch*] - this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses [*es durchströmt*] strongly through its veins from Maine to California the blood of purposes and enterprise [*Zwecke und Unternehmungen*] and high resolve [*hohe Entschlossenheit*]. Throughout the 17th Century and the 18th Century and the 19th Century, this continent

teemed [*dieser Kontinent wimmelte von ...*] with manifold [*vielfältig*] projects and magnificent purposes. Above them all and weaving them all together into the most exciting flag of all the world and of all history was the triumphal purpose of freedom. It is in this spirit that all of us are called, each to his own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to create the first great
5 *American Century.*

*Wer nichts weiß,
muss alles glauben!*
Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach



HK 2020/21



*Geschichte der USA
im 20. Jahrhundert*